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The investments parents make in their children can be gender specific.
I study the impact of family planning policies on gender-specific outcomes.
Empirically, this paper uses China’s Family Planning Policy (FPP), enacted
in 1971, to understand how a reduction in the number of children in a family
can generate gender-specific outcomes. I mainly use the diff-in-diff strategy to
compare the educational outcomes of boys and of girls born before and after
the FPP was implemented. I find that while post-FPP-born children gen-
erally complete higher levels of education, this effect is particularly stronger
for girls. This finding is robust to (1) using the diff-in-diff-in-diff strategy by
incorporating another dimension of variation: different fertility constraints
imposed by the FPP on the ethnic majority Han than those imposed on eth-
nic minorities; and (2) using a different measure of educational outcomes:
the probability of pursuing an education beyond the compulsory education
period. In addition, I document that the FPP also has an impact on changing
women’s preference for their child’s gender. Post-FPP-born women show a
more pronounced change in gender attitudes and exhibit less son preference
than their male counterparts.
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Since Becker and Lewis (1973) introduced the idea that the quantity and quality
of children may be inversely related to each other, parents’ decision making re-
garding investments in their children’s human capital has received much attention.
Parents’ investments in their children may not only depend on quantity, but also
can be gender specific. However, so far no systematic evidence has been produced
on the relationship between the quantity and quality of children when parents have
a gender preference, and it is not clear whether reducing the number of children
in the family has equal effects on improving the quality of both genders. This pa-
per fills this gap in the literature by examining the gender-specific effects of family
planning policies on children’s educational outcomes.
Previous theoretical work (e.g. Davies and Zhang, 1995) has shown that, in
the presence of a gender preference, parents’ investments in their children’s human
capital become more complicated and may generate gender-specific outcomes. How-
ever, empirical investigations on this subject are methodologically challenging, since
parents who prefer fewer children may endogenously be more pro-gender equality,
which makes it difficult to causally identify the relationship between the number of
children in a family and gender-specific human capital investments. I address this
identification problem by taking advantage of the family planning policy enacted in
China in 1971.
To control the rapidly growing population, in 1971 the Chinese central govern-
ment approved a family planning policy (FPP) that has been in effect, with some
adjustments, ever since1. The FPP had different impacts on the family size of agri-
cultural Hukou households and non-agricultural Hukou households2. Specifically,
1In 1978, the FPP was tightened to restrict each household to only one child, a regulation
that became known as the “One Child Policy”. Four years later, in 1982, the One Child Policy
was revised to allow eligible families to have a second child; as of 2016, every family is permitted
to have two children. Please see Section 2.1 for more details.
2Hukou is the household registration system in China. It classifies every Chinese resident,
regardless of his/her ethnicity, as either agricultural or non-agricultural. This classification origi-
nated in the 1950s and has passed from generation to generation ever since. Section B.2 provides
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the FPP caused a greater drop in the number of children per family in agricul-
tural households than in non-agricultural families, because agricultural households
generally had a greater demand for large familes. Moreover, the FPP imposed dif-
ferent birth constraints on families based on the parents’ ethnicities. Compared
to the ethnic majority group, Han, exceptions to the FPP were granted to ethnic
minorities until 1978. This empirical setting allows me to overcome identification
problems by using the differences-in-differences (DID) and differences-in-differences-
in-differences (DDD) strategies to identify the causal effect of reducing the number
of children in a family on educational outcomes for boys and for girls.
To estimate the effect of the FPP on the relative educational attainment of boys
and of girls, I first compare the number of years of education completed for boys with
the number completed for girls for cohorts born before and cohorts born after the
FPP was enacted . My identification is based on the assumption that, in the absence
of the FPP, the educational attainment of boys and girls should be parallel. Second,
because agricultural families typically had many more children before the FPP was
implemented, I find that the policy had a greater impact on reducing the number of
children in agricultural Hukou families, and then I exploit this additional dimension
of variation between agricultural Hukou and non-agricultural Hukou families. This
allows me to further validate my identification strategy by testing whether the effect
of the FPP on gender-specific educational outcomes was more pronounced in the
Hukou group that experienced a greater drop in the number of children per family.
I find the FPP impacted girls more than boys with respect to the level of educa-
tion attained. The DID estimates indicate that from pre- to post-FPP period, the
level of education attained by girls increased by 0.5 years more than the increase
in the level attained by boys. The magnitude of the effect is large and significant.
Consequently, girls’ faster growth in years of education after the implementation of
the FPP effectively narrowed the education gender gap by nearly half. The DDD
more details.
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estimates indicate that the effect was more pronounced in agricultural girls: from
pre- to post-FPP period, non-agricultural girls’ education levels increased by 0.35
more years than did non-agricultural boys’ education levels, whereas agricultural
girls’ education levels increased by 0.49 more years than agricultural boys’ edu-
cation levels did. This reflects a faster rate of reduction of the education gender
gap for agricultural households than for non-agricultural households. The results
are robust and significant after controlling for birth prefecture fixed effects, cohort
fixed effects, and time linear trend. These results indicate that in China, where son
preference is prevalent, reducing the number of children in a family had a sizable
impact on improving the educational attainment of girls and reducing the education
gender gap.
I perform additional checks to ensure that my results were not driven by other
confounding factors. First, using the same strategy, I estimate the effect of the
FPP on higher educational attainment, which I define as education beyond ninth
grade (equivalent to a post-secondary education). This exercise allows me to disen-
tangle the effect of the FPP from the effect of the compulsory nine-year education
policy that has been in place since 1986. The results are significant and in line
with my main findings: from pre- to post-FPP period, the rate of continuing into
post-secondary education increased by 7.3 percentage points more for girls than
it increased for boys; this effect was 6.7 percentage points higher for agricultural
girls, suggesting that my main findings are not just picking up the supply-side ef-
fects of the compulsory education policy. Second, in placebo tests, I repeat the
same strategy using ethnic minorities as a placebo group. I find that the effect of
the FPP on gender-specific educational attainment was significantly higher for the
ethnic majority, Han, than for ethnic minorities, who are subject to fewer birth
restrictions. The results provide additional evidence to support my identification
strategy, suggesting that my main findings do not simply reflect a catch-up effect in
girls’ educational attainment. Third, to address the concern that if parents did gen-
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der selections, it may threaten my identification strategy by having an endogenous
effect on the child’s gender, I first show that gender selections are unlikely to affect
my results because prenatal gender-revealing technology was not available for the
period of my study and infanticide was costly and inefficient3. I also demonstrate
that my results are robust with the inclusion of prefecture-year gender ratios.
Next, I explore potential mechanisms to explain why, in a society with a strong
son preference, reducing the number of children in a family could favour girls. I
lay out three explanations. First, reducing the number of children may change par-
ents’ perceptions about the role of women and, thus, reduce their son preference,
so that relatively more resources may be allocated to daughters. Second, if parents
view spending for their children’s education as a form of consumption, reducing the
number of children in a family may reduce the total costs of raising children, gener-
ating an effect similar to increasing the household income. The implied increase in
household income can then induce an income effect on educational spending for sons
and daughters. Third, if parents view spending on their children’s education as a
form of investment, when the availability of higher-return products (sons) decreases,
risk-averse parents may increase their investment in daughters for risk diversifica-
tion purposes. Using data on gender ratio and son preference, I present evidence
against the first channel that the FPP might decrease parents’ son preference. For
the second and third explanations, I provide indirect evidence that suggests that
the risk diversification channel appears most in line with the data patterns.
In addition, using the same DID strategy, I show that the FPP had a significant
impact on weakening the son preference of the post-FPP born cohort members, and
this effect was particularly pronounced for females. This result is consistent with
the channel of income effect and the channel of risk diversification, and against
the channel of parents’ son preference changing, providing additional evidence to
3Figure A1 notes that the gender ratio was not skewed to any significant degree until the 1980s,
when the prenatal gender-revealing technology became widely available and abortion became the
dominant way for parents to select their child’s gender.
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support my conclusion on the three channels as noted previously. The findings
suggest that son preference and, more generally, gender attitudes are not immutable
and can be changed by increasing females’ educational attainment levels, by creating
a more equal growing environment for boys and girls and by freeing women from
the burden of excessive fertility and childcare.
Overall, the findings presented in this paper show that the FPP, while target-
ing a reduction in fertility rates, have also indirectly reduced gender inequality in
educational attainment and weaken son preference. Previous work on this subject
has not connected family planning policy to gender inequality reduction. Moreover,
most previous studies focused on the negative aspects of the FPP (Qian, 2009;
Zhu et al., 2009; Edlund et al., 2013). This paper fills the resulting gap in the
literature by investigating the positive effects of the FPP, namely, improving ed-
ucational opportunities for girls and changing gender attitudes. I also contribute
to the literature on the quantity-quality trade-off of children by showing that the
quality outcomes of reducing the quantity of children can be very different for the
two genders. Lastly, this article speaks to the literature on the determinants of
gender preference. Though previous studies have suggested a strong persistence in
gender attitudes across generations, I provide evidence that gender attitudes can
be changed through multiple channels.
This paper is closely related to Huang et al. (2015), who independently studied
a similar topic –the impact of the One Child Policy on the education of girls
in China –using a different empirical methodology. My paper is different from
theirs in two important respects. First, I examine a more general version of family
planning policy. Thus, my research generates more practical policy implications for
countries that are considering population growth reduction strategies. Second, in
addition to the immediate and positive effect of eliminating the education gender
gap, my paper also examines the long-term impact of the FPP on changing gender
attitudes. Finally, the results of this paper shed light on potential mechanisms
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behind the impact of the FPP.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the empiri-
cal strategy and policy background. Section 3 describes the data and presents the
empirical results. Section 4 presents further evidence to understand the mecha-
nism. Section 5 discusses the findings and provides additional findings on gender
preference. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Strategy
Empirical investigations on the relation between the quantity of children in a
family and human capital investment inequality among children often face identi-
fication challenges: parents who prefer fewer children may endogenously be more
pro-gender equality, which makes it difficult to causally identify the effect of reduc-
ing family size on the two genders. I address this identification problem by taking
advantage of family planning programmes in China, which created an exogeneous
shock to the size of families. Hence, in addition to between-gender comparisons of
educational attainment, I also examine the second difference between cohorts born
before the FPP was implemented and those born after.
2.1 Background
Family planning programmes in China were officially launched in 1971 upon
the approval of The report on the work of the family planning policy by the State
Council of China and were included in the 4th Five-Year Plan(1971-1975). Soon
after, family planning offices were set up at all administrative levels, and birth
control work was carried out. The objective of the family planning campaign at
that time, as advocated in the campaign slogan, was “one is not too few, two
is perfect, and three is too many”. Later, in the 1973 national family planning
symposium, a more explicit policy “later, less frequent and fewer” (“晚、稀、少”)
7
was introduced. “Later” refers to women must not get married by age 23 and give
birth to their first child by age 24; “less frequent” indicates the birth spacing must
be no less than three years; “fewer” reflects the policy restriction limiting couples to
having no more than two children. The policies for agricultural and non-agricultural
households were the same until 19824. The target population of the FPP is China’s
majority ethnic group - Han, which accounts for 93% population. Ethnic minorities
were not as restricted as Han citizens5.
The predominant method of birth control at that time was the IUD (intrauter-
ine device). Other methods used included tubal ligation and vasectomy. Forced
abortions also took place in some circumstances when a woman was found to be
carrying an out-of-quota child. Figure 1 shows the volume of the different types of
birth control surgeries since 1971. This implies that the strength of the compulsory
birth controls has remained quite stable since the policy went into effect, except in
19836. Figure A2 shows that the FPP has significantly decreased the population
growth rate, lowering it by more than half in the first ten years since its imple-
mentation. The decrease in family size is also reflected in the total fertility rate.
Figure 2a shows that the average number of births dropped from 5.8 births per
woman when the FPP was first introduced to 2.2 births per woman 10 years after
the implementation. Figure 2b shows that the drop mainly occurred in agricultural
households. Intuitively, before agriculture was mechanised, the work done in fields
required a large amount of physical labour, so agricultural households had a greater
demand for large familes; thus, the FPP had a greater impact on the family size of
agricultural households.
4In March 1978, a stricter policy, later commonly known as the One Child Policy, was adopted.
Then in 1982, the family planning policy was revised to allow families that satisfied certain con-
ditions to have a second child. Please see B.1 in Appendix for more details.
5During this period, the policy for ethnic minorities was “In less populated minority areas,
technical guidance for family planning should be given to those who have birth control willing-
ness.”. From 1978 onwards, “Exceptions to the One Child Policy can only be granted to ethnic
minorities with a population of 10 million or less. Couples of those ethnicities can have two
children, and some may have three, but four children are not allowed.”
6From 1982 to 1983 a more aggressive protocol “first birth IUD, second birth tubal ligation”
was temporarily enforced nationwide.
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2.2 Hypothesis
To test whether reductions in family size had gender-specific education out-
comes, I first considere how family size affected the educational attainment of girls
versus how it affected boys during two periods: (1) before 1971, when there were
no constraints on family size; and (2) after 1971, when the FPP imposed restric-
tions on family size. In particular, I expect to find a greater increase in educational
attainments for girls than for boys in the post-FPP period.
Second, to avoid confounding the effect of the FPP with other policies or events
that took place during the same period, I further test whether the gender-specific
effect of the FPP on educational attainment varied with the effectiveness of the
intervention across different Hukou groups. In particular, I test whether the effect
of the FPP on girls’ educational attainment was stronger in the Hukou group that
experienced greater reductions in family sizes. This group was also the one with
higher initial fertility rates before the FPP was enacted. I expect that girls in Hukou
group with higher initial fertility rates pre-FPP will show a greater increase in
educational attainment after implementation of the FPP, compared to the increase
experienced by girls in the other Hukou group.
2.3 Identification strategy
Using the DID approach, I estimate the effect of a decrease in family size on
relative female human capital accumulations by comparing the average education
level achieved by boys to the average achieved by girls for two cohort groups: one
born before implementation of the FPP and the other born after. Comparing the
educational attainment level of boys to that of girls across cohorts differences out
time-invariant gender characteristics. Comparing between the two genders within
cohorts differences out changes over time that affect the cohorts similarly. The
identifying assumption of the DID approach is that in the absence of the FPP,
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the education level of boys and girls should be parallel. The parallel trends as-
sumption would be threatened if the two genders experienced different pre-trends
in educational attainment, which may cause the DID estimate to capture differ-
ences between boys and girls for reasons other than the reduction in family size.
An illustration of the years of education completed by boys and girls shows that
this is not the case. Figure 3a plots the years of education completed by boys and
girls for each birth cohort. The vertical distance between the two lines shows that,
prior to implementation of the FPP, boys consistently completed one more year of
education than girls, whereas after the FPP, girls’ educational attainment increased
at a much faster rate than boys’ educational attainment. In the 10 years after im-
plementation of the FPP, the education gap between boys and girls dropped to
0.3 years. Hence, if pre-trends can be extrapolated into the post-FPP period, the
DID estimates would not capture differences in pre-FPP trends in the education
attainment levels of boys and girls.
For the DID estimate, I restrict the sample to the cohorts born between 1961
and 1981, which encompasses 10 years before and 10 years after implementation of
the FPP, and exclude ethnic minorities. I estimate the following equation:
Eduipc = φ1girli + φ2postc + β(girli × postc) + tc + γp + α + εipc (1)
The educational attainment of an individual i, born in birthyear c and prefecture p,
is a function of girli, the individual’s gender; postc, a dummy variable that indicates
if the individual is born after 1971, and the interaction terms between girli and
postc; tc, cohort fixed effect; γp, prefecture fixed effect. The reference group is
individuals born during the 1961–1970 period. It and all of its interaction terms
are dropped. If the decrease in family size increased girls’ educational attainment
levels, then it should be reflected in an increase in girls’ average years of education
relative to boys’ for cohorts born after the FPP, β > 0.
Though the FPP went into effect in 1971, it might affect individuals born a few
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years earlier than 1971. Consider, for example, the third child in a three-children
family. If, in the absence of the FPP, the family might end up with more children.
In the presence of the FPP, the family had to stop after having three children.
Therefore, even the third child born prior to the implementation of the FPP would
benefit from the reduction in family size. In other words, there is a portion of
children who get treated, even though they were not assigned to the treatment
group, based on using 1971 as the cut-point year. The existence of “takers” in the
reference group does not threaten the validity of my identification strategy. The
estimated effects of the FPP using 1971 as the cut-point would be biased downward,
so the actual effect of the FPP on narrowing the gender education gap should be
larger than estimated.
One pitfall of the DID approach is that it may confound the effects of the
FPP implementation with the effects of other changes that occurred during the
pre- or post-FPP period; for example, the compulsory nine-year education law,
which took effect in 1986, aiming to keep all school-aged children (6–15 years old)
in school for a minimum of nine years, may generate supply-side effects, which
may confound with the demand-side effects of the FPP. I address this concern by
examining individual educational attainment beyond nine years in the robustness
check.
Another concern of the DID approach is if, at the time of the FPP, there is a
change in attitude towards girls’ getting more education for unobserved reasons.
For example, if families who have daughters born after 1971 suddenly became more
progressive regarding their daughters’ education for unobserved reasons other than
reductions in family size, or if there were a sudden change in returns on girls’ edu-
cation, then the estimates of the effect of the FPP would capture both the effects
of reductions in family size and the effects of the change in attitude or returns.
Although I cannot directly resolve this problem, I provide evidence that this is not
likely the case by exploiting exogeneous variations in the reduction in family sizes
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according to Hukou status. My identification is based on the assumption that the
FPP had a greater impact on the family size of agricultural households, for which
birth restrictions resulted in greater reductions in family sizes. Recall as shown
in Figure 2b, for the period 1970–1980, the total fertility rate for agricultural
Han households dropped by nearly 4 births, while the rate for non-agricultural
Han households dropped by 2.1 births, implying that the FPP had the greatest
impact on the family size of agricultural households. Thus, the identifying assump-
tion is that the effects on agricultural households and non-agricultural households
should not be very different if brought about by changes in attitudes towards girls’
education or changes in returns to education. If agricultural households and non-
agricultural households show significant differences in the growth of girls’ educa-
tional attainment, at a minimum, we would not expect agricultural girls to show a
more pronounced change than non-agricultural girls, unless it were due to a catch-
up effect. In the placebo test, I show changes did not result from the catch-up effect
by comparing the educational attainment of girls relative to that of boys between
agricultural Han and agricultural ethnic minorities.
Using the DDD approach, I estimate the effect of a decrease in family size on
relative female human capital accumulations by exploiting variations in the fam-
ily size reductions caused by the FPP. To illustrate the effect differences between
agricultural individuals and non-agricultural individuals, I plot the average years
of education completed by boys and by girls for agricultural and non-agricultural
Hukou status, respectively. Figure 3a shows that since the implementation of the
FPP in 1971, girls’ educational attainment levels have grown faster than boys’ lev-
els. Figure 3b and 3c shows that by 1981 the agricultural education gender gap
(male’s education − female’s education) dropped by 0.6 years (from 1 to 0.4), while
the non-agricultural education gender gap dropped by 0.5 years (from 0.5 to 0). I
estimate the DDD effects of reductions in family sizes on education gender gaps
12
using the following equation:
Yipc =φ1girli + φ2postc + φ3agi
+ β1(girli × postc) + β2(girli × agi) + β3(agi × postc)
+ θ(girli × agi × postc) + tc + γp + α + εipc (2)
The educational attainment of an individual i, born in birthyear c and prefecture
p, is a function of girli, the individual’s gender; agi, the individual’s Hukou status,
equal to 1 if the individual has agricultural Hukou; postc, a dummy variable that
indicates if an individual is born after 1971, and all the interaction terms between
girli, agi and postc; tc, cohort fixed effect; γp, prefecture fixed effect. The reference
group is individuals born from 1961 to 1970. It and all of its interaction terms are
dropped. If reductions in family size improved girls’ educational attainment, given
that agricultural families experienced the greatest drop in family size, agricultural
girls should have the most pronounced improvement in their education attainment,
θ > 0.
To further validate the parallel trends assumptions, I examine whether the effect
of the FPP on girls’ educational attainment occurred more rigorously for those born
in the years closest to the FPP starting year by regressing individuals’ years of edu-
cation on their genders, Hukou status, birth year dummy variables, and interaction




φ2τdτ + φ3agi +
1981∑
τ=1961




β3τ (agi × dτ ) +
1981∑
τ=1961
θτ (girli × agi × dτ ) + tc + γp + α + εipc (3)
The educational attainment of an individual i, born in birthyear c and prefecture
p, is a function of girli, the individual’s gender; agi, the individual’s Hukou status,
equal to 1 if the individual has agricultural Hukou; dτ , a dummy variable that indi-
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cates if the individual is born in cohort τ , and all the interaction terms between girli,
agi and τ ; tc, cohort fixed effect; γp, prefecture fixed effect. This specification allows
for anticipatory effects of FPP on agricultural girls (θ1961, θ1962, . . . , β1970) and post-
FPP effects (β1972, β1973, . . . , β1981). The reference group is individuals born in 1970,
one year before the start of the FPP. It and all of its interaction terms are dropped.∑1981
τ=1961 φ2τdτ and
∑1981
τ=1961 β1τ (girli × dτ ) impose the parallel trends assumption
for boys and girls while allowing for girl-specific trend.
∑1981
τ=1961 θτ (girli× agi× dτ )
further allows agricultural girls to have a specific trend. This is flexible because I
allow potential pre-existing gender-specific trends and gender-Hukou-specific trends
with the assumption that pre-existing trends should be extrapolated into post-FPP
periods in the absence of the FPP. Given that agricultural families experienced the
greatest decrease in family size, my identification strategy will be validated if we
observe a significant change in θτ , the slope of agricultural-girl-specific trend around
the implementation of the FPP.
3 Data and Empirical Results
3.1 Data
The analysis of girls’ educational attainment relative to that of their male coun-
terparts uses the 1% sample of the 2000 China population census, which contains
data on gender, birth year and educational attainment. I restrict the sample to
individuals born between 1961 and 1981, which is 10 years before and 10 years after
the FPP was implemented in 1971. The 10-year period should be long enough to
establish a trend that can be extrapolated into the post-FPP period. The upper
boundary is set at 1981 so that, by the time the survey was conducted, all individ-
uals in the sample were at least 18 years old or older and, therefore, should have
completed high school. Otherwise, the sample would have contained individuals
who would eventually complete high school but had not done so yet, and the effect
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of interest would have been underestimated. The educational outcome in the main
analysis is measured by the years of education completed based on the individual’s
highest education degree. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the sample.
The average demographic characteristics between agricultural and non-agricultural
households and between Han and ethnic minorities are similar7.
Gender selection has been accused of being a major negative consequence of
the FPP: constrained by the policy, parents who prefer a specific gender strongly
over the other gender may choose to select the gender of their child. If gender
selections were prevalent, it would pose challenges to the exogeneous aspect of an
individual’s gender, thus threatening my identification strategy. Using findings from
previous literature and data, I show that gender selections are not likely to affect
my results. First, gender-selective abortions in China were rare until the 1980s,
when gender detection technology - ultrasound B - became available. Prior to
the adoption of ultrasound B, gender selection usually took the form of infanticide,
child abandonment or neglect, all of which are very costly in terms of both time and
labour because pregnancies must be carried to term before the gender of the child
is revealed. Because it was practically difficult to obtain prenatal gender-selective
abortions before the introduction of ultrasound B, and the cost of post-birth gender
selection was also high, gender selection rarely impacted cohorts born before the
1980s. Figure A1 plots the sex ratios from 1955 to 2000. It shows that the sex
ratio remained between 1 and 1.07 before 1982. Given the natural rate of 1.06, it
should not be interpreted as aberrant. This figure also lends support to the findings
in the existing literature that the availability of gender detection technology was
the prominent cause for the increase in the sex ratios in the 1980s. In addition, to
provide additional evidence to support my identification strategy, I also show that
my results are robust with the inclusion of prefecture-year sex ratios.
7Migration rate is higher in non-agricultural households. Although it is highly unlikely that
the difference in migration undermines the validity of my identification strategy, I show that my
results are robust by using a sample with migrants dropped. The result is available upon request.
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3.2 Results
I explore the over-birth cohorts and across-gender variations in individuals to
estimate the gender-specific effects of the FPP on individuals’ human capital ac-
cumulations. The DID estimates from Equation (1) using individuals’ years of
education completed as a dependant variable are shown in columns (1)–(3) in
Table 2. Column (1) presents the results, including birth cohort fixed effects, and
column (2) includes birth prefecture fixed effects. Column (3) includes a linear time
trend as a substitute for birth cohort fixed effects. The variable of interest here is
girli × postc, which is the estimated mean impact of the FPP on girls’ levels of ed-
ucational attainment relative to boys’ levels. Estimates from all the specifications
show that the effect of the FPP on girls’ educational attainment is positive and sig-
nificant: compared to girls born prior to implementation of the FPP, girls born in
the post-FPP period show a greater increase in years of education completed than
boys who were born in the same birth cohort and living in the same prefecture. All
the specifications, regardless of including birth cohort fixed effects or including a
linear time trend, yield similar estimates, all statistically significant at the level of
1%. They all show that the years of education completed for girls born in the post-
FPP period increased by 0.5 more years than the years completed by boys. The
magnitude of the effect is large and significant. Consequently, girls’ faster growth in
years of education completed after implementation of the FPP effectively reduced
the gender gap in education by nearly half.
To further explore variations in the reduction in family size across Hukou groups,
I report the results for the DDD estimation of Equation (2). The FPP had a greater
impact on the family size of agricultural households, for which birth restrictions
resulted in greater family size reductions. Compared to the DID specification,
the DDD specification further includes agi, a dummy variable for an individual’s
Hukou status, and all the interaction terms between girli, postc and agi. The
results for the DDD estimation are presented in columns (4)–(6). Column (4)
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presents the results, including birth cohort fixed effects, and column (5) includes
birth prefecture fixed effects. Column (6) includes a linear time trend as a substitute
for birth cohort fixed effects. The variable of interest here is girli × agi × postc,
which is the estimated mean impact of the FPP on agricultural girls’ educational
attainment levels relative to the attainment levels of agricultural boys, compared to
the educational attainment levels of non-agricultural girls relative to that of non-
agricultural boys. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that the FPP had the
greatest effect on the educational attainment of agricultural girls. In particular,
girls born in agricultural households in the post-FPP period experienced the most
pronounced growth in educational attainment levels, compared to the growth in
levels for girls in non-agricultural households. Estimates from all the specifications,
regardless of the inclusion of birth cohort fixed effects or a linear time trend, yield
similar estimates, all statistically significant at the 1% level. They all show that
from pre- to post- FPP period, the educational attainment levels of non-agricultural
girls increased by 0.35 years more than the levels of non-agricultural boys, whereas
the educational attainment levels of agricultural girls increased by 0.49 years more
than the levels of agricultural boys. The magnitude of the effect is significant and
meaningful. It implies that the gender gap in education was narrowing at a faster
rate for agricultural households than for non-agricultural households.
Figure 4 plots the vector of coefficient estimates for θτ from equation (3). They
show that for cohorts born prior to the implementation of the FPP, the growth in
educational attainment levels for agricultural girls were not significantly different
from the growth in the levels of other groups (agricultural and non-agricultural
boys and non-agricultural girls) and were constant across cohorts. The estimated
coefficients became significantly positive for cohorts born around the time the FPP
was implemented, when agricultural households started to undergo greater reduc-
tions in family size. After the FPP, the coefficient estimates were consistently
positive, which suggests that the educational attainment of agricultural girls con-
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tinued growing at the fastest rate, compared to the growth in rates of other groups.
These results lend support to the main results estimated using the DID and DDD
methods8. In particular, these results provide further evidence in favour of my iden-
tification that for cohorts born after implementation of the FPP, girls’ educational
attainments levels increased faster than boys’ attainment levels, and that agricul-
tural girls’ educational attainment levels increased faster than non-agricultural girls’
educational attainment levels, both of which are attributable to the reduction in
family size as an outcome of the FPP and not to other changes.
3.3 Robustness checks
If the enforcement of the nine-year compulsory education policy raised girls’
participation in primary and secondary education up to ninth grade, my empirical
strategy will confound the effect of the FPP with the effect of the nine-year com-
pulsory education law. This policy came into effect in 1986 with the goal of keeping
all school-aged children (6–15 years old) in school for a minimum of nine years.
One possible channel that the nine-year compulsory education policy may confound
with my results is through reducing the cost of education. This policy authorised
a reduction in tuition fees in public primary and secondary schools; thus, parents
might use the money saved to fund their children’s education beyond the compul-
sory nine years. However, this is unlikely to happen in China. The amount saved
in tuition fees from primary and secondary education are not comparable to the
costs of post-secondary and higher education. According to a report by the Rural
Education Action Project (REAP), China has the highest tuitions in the world for
public senior high schools, nearly three times the world’s second-highest tuition in
Indonesia. It costs, on average, 1,100 RMB (approximately 160 U.S. dollars) per
8Coefficients estimates for girli × postc from DID specification are plotted in Figure A3 in
Appendix. It shows similar patterns. The coefficient estimates for cohorts born after implemen-
tation of the FPP were consistently positive, suggesting that the educational attainment levels of
girls born after implementation of the FPP grew faster than the attainment levels of boys.
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student per year in rural regions9 and three years of high school tuition in rural
China accounts for 82% of the net per capita income of rural people (Liu et al.,
2009; NBS, 2008). . Hence, pursuing an education beyond the compulsory nine
years is not simply a result of reallocating education budgets. Instead, parents
need to make serious investment decisions as well as adjust family consumptions
and savings accordingly.
In order to disentangle the effect of the FPP on girls’ educational attainments
from the effect of the nine-year compulsory education policy, I perform robustness
checks, using an alternative measure of educational attainment: whether an indi-
vidual completed more than the compulsory nine years of education. Specifically,
I use the same specification as in the DDD regressions with the outcome variable
substituted by a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the highest level of education an
individual achieved exceeded ninth grade, and 0 otherwise. Results are presented
in Table 3. Columns (1)–(3) show the DID results and columns (4)–(6) show the
DDD results. Columns (1) and (4) present the results, including birth cohort fixed
effects, and columns (2) and (5) include birth prefecture fixed effects. Columns (3)
and (6) include a linear time trend as a substitute for birth cohort fixed effects. Sim-
ilar to the main results in section 3.2, I find that the FPP had the greatest effect on
the educational attainment levels of agricultural girls, measured by the probability
of completing more than nine years of education. In particular, girls born in agricul-
tural households in the post-FPP period experienced the most pronounced increases
in the probability of completing more than nine years of education –equivalent to
attaining a post-secondary level of education –compared to agricultural boys and
non-agricultural boys and girls. Coefficient estimates of girli × postc from all the
specifications, as shown in columns (1)–(3), showed that compared to pre-FPP
born cohorts, post-FPP born girls’ probability of continuing into post-secondary
education increased by 7.3% more than the probability for boys. Coefficient esti-
9This amount does not include costs such as housing and everyday living expenses.
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mates of girli×agi×postc from all the specifications, as shown in columns (4)–(6),
shows that, compared to the pre-FPP born cohorts, the probability of post-FPP
born non-agricultural girls continuing into post-secondary education increased by
1.8% more than the probability for non-agricultural boys; for agricultural girls, com-
pared to pre-FPP born cohorts, the likelihood of post-FPP born girls continuing
into post-secondary education increased by 8.5% more than the likelihood for boys.
The results imply that the education gender gap created by the difference in rates
of males and females continuing into post-secondary education was narrowing at a
faster rate for agricultural Hukou individuals than for their non-agricultural coun-
terparts. These findings are consistent with my main findings that use individuals’
years of education as outcomes, suggesting that my findings are robust by using
alternative measures of educational attainment.
3.4 Additional placebo tests
To provide additional evidence in favour of my identification strategy, I test
whether the effect of the FPP on ethnic minorities was similar to the effect on the
ethnic majority, Han. In section 2.1, I discussed the different births restrictions the
FPP imposed across Han and ethnic minorities in China. In brief, ethnic minorities
were not as restricted as Han citizens, and birth restrictions on ethnic minorities
went into effect a few years later than they did for the Han population. Figure 2b
clearly shows differences in the timing and in reductions in the number of births
under the FPP between ethnic minorities and Han. In particular, Hans’ fertility
rates fell right after implementation of the FPP, whereas ethnic minorities’ fertility
rates did not fall until 1975. Furthermore, given similar fertility rates between ethnic
minorities and agricultural Han at the time when the FPP became effective, in the
10 years after implementation of the FPP, agricultural Han’s fertility rates dropped
by nearly 4 births, whereas ethnic minorities’ rates dropped by 2.5 births. Hence,
ethnic minorities could serve as a placebo to verify my identification strategy. To
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test whether the effect of the FPP on ethnic minorities was similar to the effect on
Han citizens, I estimate a regression equation similar to the DDD specification as in
Equation (2). Due to the vast differences between agricultural and non-agricultural
populations in the reductions in fertility rates, to tease out the heterogeneous effect
across Hukou groups within Han populations and focus on the comparison of the
effects between ethnic minorities and Han, I restrict my sample to agricultural
population and then compare the effects of the FPP between agricultural ethnic
minorities and agricultural Han by estimating the following equation:
Yipc =φ1girli + φ2postc + φ3Hani
+ β1(girli × postc) + β2(girli ×Hani) + β3(Hani × postc)
+ θ(girli ×Hani × postc) + tc + γp + α + εipc (4)
The educational attainment of an individual i, born in birthyear c and prefecture
p, is a function of girli, the individual’s gender; Hani, the individual’s ethnic group,
equal to 1 if the individual is of Han ethnic; postc, a dummy variable that indicates
if an individual is born after 1971, and all the interaction terms between girli, Hani
and postc; tc, cohort fixed effect; γp, prefecture fixed effect. The reference group is
individuals born from 1961 to 1970. It and all of its interaction terms are dropped.
If reducing the number of children increased girls’ educational attainment, given
that the birth limitations were stricter for Han citizens, Han girls should have the
most pronounced increase in their educational attainment, θ > 0.
Table 4 in the Appendix presents the results for the placebo tests according to
Equation (4). Columns (1)–(3) show the results using years of education as an
outcome variable, and columns (4)–(6) show the results using a dummy variable
of whether an individual’s educational attainment exceeded nine years. Coefficient
estimates of girli × Hani × postc in all the specifications are significantly posi-
tive. They show that the FPP had a greater impact on increasing the educational
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attainment levels of ethnic Han girls, compared to the impact on girls of ethnic
minorities. The results provide additional evidence in favour of my identification
strategy, suggesting that my main findings do not merely pick up a catch-up effect
in girls’ education.
4 Understanding the mechanism
Having shown empirical findings on the link between reducing the number of
children in a family and improvement in girls’ educational attainment levels, I turn
to understanding the mechanism. In the absence of the FPP, the educational at-
tainments of boys and girls are substantially different in China because parents
prefer to invest in sons rather than daughters. The FPP may operate through three
channels to increase relative educational attainment levels for girls. First, it may
increase parents’ incentives to invest in the education of their daughters if, for some
reason, reducing the number of children in a family changes the parents’ perceptions
about the role of women and reduces parents’ son preference or increases parents’
daughter preference. Second, reducing the number of children in a family may re-
duce the total costs of raising children, generating an effect similar to increasing
household income. If parents view spending for their children’s education as a form
of consumption, the implied increase in household income can then induce an in-
come effect on the educational spending for sons and daughters. Third, if parents
view children’s educational spending as a form of investment and view sons and
daughters as different types of investment products, and if parents prefer sons be-
cause sons are expected to yield high returns, when fewer products are available
for parents to invest in (i.e. when birth restrictions are imposed that reduce the
number of children in a family and, thus, the number of sons), risk-averse parents
may increase their investment in their daughters’ education for risk diversification
purposes.
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Using census data on gender ratio and suvey data on son preference, I present
evidence against the first hypothesis that the FPP might decrease parents’ son
preference. For the second and third channels, although the data used in this paper
do not allow for a distinction between the second and the third channels, I provide
indirect evidence that suggests that my empirical findings are more in line with the
third channel.
The first hypothesis makes the prediction that decreases in the number of chil-
dren in a family should increase the relative desirability of having daughters for
parents. To examine this, I plot China’s gender ratio at birth and total fertility
rate for each year since 1960. The plot is shown in Figure 5. It shows that in
the 1980s, under a stricter version of the FPP (i.e. the One Child Policy), average
births per woman experienced more decreases. Yet, when gender detection technol-
ogy, which substantially reduces the cost of gender selection, became available, the
gender ratio spurred. These patterns suggest that birth restrictions or reduced fam-
ily size did not increase parents’ daughter preference. Hence, the first explanation
can be ruled out.
To disentangle the second explanation regarding the effect of increases in house-
hold income and the third explanation regarding risk diversification, we need data
on Chinese household decision making since the 1960s, which are difficult to obtain.
Although the data available do not allow me to identify the exact channel between
the second and third explanation, I discuss the possibility of the second and the
third explanation in the context of China during the 1970s and 1980s. The second
explanation assumes education to be a normal good, and it requires diminishing
returns on children’s education for income effect to happen, so that when house-
hold income increases, parents may substitute consumption of their son’s education
with consumption of their daughter’s education. By contrast, the third explana-
tion does not assume diminishing returns on education; instead, it assumes that
investing in higher education involves more risks than investing in primary and
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secondary education. In reality, lacking wage data by educational level from the
1970s makes it difficult to empirically test the second explanation’s assumption of
diminishing returns on education; however, there are several reasons to think that
this is not the primary reason. First, before the 1978 market reform, there was no
private sector and employment by state-owned enterprises was virtually exclusive
to non-agricultural Hukou holders. Transfer of Hukou status from agricultural to
non-agricultural was highly restricted, with acceptance to university being a major
channel10. Carter (1997) estimates that the per capita income of urban residents
was more than double that of rural residents in 1978. Moreover, agricultural Hukou
households were unable to access state welfare programs (Young, 2013). In a word,
the much higher earnings and the superior welfare that were associated exclusively
with non-agricultural Hukou status made non-agricultural Hukou status very ap-
pealing. Transfer of Hukou status from agricultural to non-agricultural was highly
restricted, with acceptance to university being a major channel. Hence, given that
acceptance to university was a major channel to transfer Hukou status from agri-
cultural to non-agricultural, it is doubtful that higher education before 1978 had
diminishing returns, which contradicts the assumption of the second explanation.
Second, a number of previous research has estimated returns on education in the
post-1978 reform period. Zhang et al. (2005) estimates the marginal return on ed-
ucation to be similar across education levels in 198811. Moreover, the estimates
of marginal returns to completing university compared to completing senior high
school grew much faster than marginal returns on lower education levels and ex-
ceeded the marginal return on completing junior high to a large extent since 1990.
These estimates suggest increasing returns on education in the post-1978 period,
which seems to invalidate the assumption of diminishing returns in the second ex-
10Official quotas were at 0.15-0.2% per year and actual conversion rates were at about 1.5%per
year (Young, 2013).
11Zhang et al. (2005) estimates that in 1988, the marginal return on completing junior high
school, compared to only completing primary school or below, was 13.9%; the marginal return
on completing senior high school compared to completing junior high school was 11%, and the
marginal return on completing university compared to completing senior high school was 12.2%.
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planation.
For the third explanation of risk diversification, the risks of investing in higher
education are, to a large extent, associated with the chances of being admitted
to university. Historical data on Chinese university admission rates, as shown in
Figure A4, indicates that in 1977, the university admission rate was only 5%, and
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, admission rates were usually below 30%.
These statistics seem to suggest it is reasonable for parents to diversify risks among
children. To see how this mechanism works, I consider three scenarios. First, in the
absence of the FPP, a family is likely to have more than one son and one daughter,
so when making education investment decisions, risk diversification can be done
among the sons. Second, in the presence of the FPP, if a family has both a son
and a daughter, risk diversification is likely to happen between the son and the
daughter; thus, compared to the first scenario, daughters, on average, are more
likely to benefit from their parents’ investment in their education. Third, in the
presence of the FPP, if a family has only a daughter, the parents are very likely to
invest in the daughter’s education as long as returns on education are higher than
saving rates.
5 Discussion
This section provides an interpretation of the empirical results, discusses the
economic implications of increasing girls’ relative educational attainment levels and
considers the long-term effect of the FPP on reducing parents’ preference for sons.
The results suggest that reductions in family size benefit girls in the form of receiving
more education, not only by increasing girls’ participation in primary and secondary
education, but also by improving girls’ opportunities to obtain a higher education
degree, which is necessary in order for females to participate in the high-skilled
labour market and is an essential step to reducing gender inequality in the labour
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market. This finding may help to explain China’s relatively high female labour
participation rate among Asian countries12 and China’s fast economic growth in
the 1990s. Moreover, increasing females’ relative education can increase women’s
bargaining power in the marriage market and in intra-household decision making.
Literature has revealed that the mother’s education is more closely related to the
child’s welfare than the father’s, suggesting that improving education opportunities
for females (i.e. future mothers) can generate positive intergenerational effects on
future generations.
In Section 4 I discussed the most possible channels through which the FPP
can affect girls’ educational attainment. Evidence suggests that the FPP worked
through channels other than changing parents’ son preference. As son preference
plays such an important role in determining gender inequality in intra-household
decision making, if son preference endures, the gender-equalising effect of the FPP
would last only for the time period it is in place. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
investigate whether the son preference of those who were born under the FPP
differs from the son preference of older cohorts.
5.1 Additional Findings on Son Preference
This question is related to the research area on the determinants of son pref-
erence. Previous literature suggests that cultures, social norms, economic motives,
education level and other social and individual factors may all affect one’s gen-
der preference (Bourne and Walker, 1991). Another strand of literature suggests a
strong persistence in gender attitudes across generations as gender role attitudes can
be transmitted from parents to children (Farre and Vella, 2013). Implementation of
the FPP provides a good social experimental setting to study if girls, when being
given a fairer amount of resources and investments in childhood and adolescence,
12According to the Human Development Report by the United Nations, China’s female labour
participation rate was 72.7% in 1990, in contrast to 47.2% in Hong Kong, 47.1% in South Korea,
50.1% in Japan and 50.7% in Singapore.
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can develop a weaker son preference when they grow up and become adults.
Hence, a similar DID strategy can be employed to test the hypothesis that
women born in post-FPP period have a weaker son preference than men. For the
DID estimate, I restrict the sample to the cohorts born from 1961 to 1990 and
estimate the following equation:
Yipc = φ1femalei + φ2postc + β(femalei × postc) + tc + γp +Xipc + α + εipc (5)
The son preference of an individual i, born in birthyear c and prefecture p, is a func-
tion of femalei, the individual’s gender; postc, a dummy variable that indicates if
the individual is born after 1971, and the interaction terms between femalei and
postc. γp and tc are province and cohort fixed effects to control for all time-invariant
differences between provinces and changes over time that affect all individuals sim-
ilarly. Xipc are individual-level covariates, including individual’s age and education
level. The reference group is individuals born between 1961 and 1970. It and all
of its interaction terms are dropped. If the FPP weakened females’ son preference,
then it should be reflected in a decrease in females’ son preference relative to males
for cohorts born after FPP, β > 0.
To test if the FPP weakened females’ son preference, I use data from the China
Family Panel Studies (CFPS)13, which contains questions on attitudes and percep-
tions that can enable testing of the hypothesis. CFPS is a nationally representative
sample14. The baseline data in CFPS were collected in 2010 and were followed up
in 2012 and 2014. For my study, I use the 2014 wave and restricd my sample to
individuals born from 1961 to 1990 to ensure that individuals in the sample were
old enough to have formed a stable gender preference. In particular, CFPS sur-
13China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) is funded by the 985 Program of Peking University and
carried out by the Institute of Social Science Survey of Peking University.
14The sample is drawn from 25 provinces in China, the collective population of which accounts
for 95% of the total Chinese population. It is randomly selected within populated regions and less
populated regions to reflect huge regional differences in population.
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veyed respondents’ son preference by asking the following question “How much do
you agree with the statement ‘A family must have at least one son’?” Respondents
then answered on a 1 to 5 scale with 1 representing “I do not agree at all” and 5
representing “I completely agree”. I use respondents’ answers to this question as
a measure of their son preference, and then I repeat the same DID identification
strategy as in Equation (5) to estimate the impact of the FPP on females’ son
preference. In some specifications, I include individual-level covariates, such as the
individual’s age and education level. Furthermore, multinomial logistics regressions
are also estimated using the same DID strategy to further investigate changes in
individuals’ answers to the question on son preference.
The results are presented in Table 5. The OLS estimates are shown in columns
(1)–(3). Column (1) presents the results without individual covariates and fixed
effects; Column (2) includes living province fixed effects and cohort fixed effects
and Column (3) further includes individual covariates. The variable of interest here
is postc × femalei, which is the estimated mean impact of the FPP on females’
son preference relative to males’ preferences. Estimates from all the specifications
show that the effect of FPP on females’ son preference is positive and significant:
compared to females born prior to the introduction of the FPP, females born in
the post-FPP period have significantly weaker son preference than males who were
born in the same birth cohort and lived in the same province. All the specifications,
regardless of including individual covariates and/or birth cohort and living province
fixed effects, yield similar estimates, all statistically significant at 1% level. They all
show that for cohorts born after implementation of the FPP, females’ son preference
was 0.3 points weaker than that of males. The magnitude of the effect is large and
significant. Given that the average son preference is 3.6 for cohorts born before FPP,
the results imply that for cohorts born in the post-FPP period, the son preference
of males decreased by 0.34 (according to the results in column (2)), equivalent to a
9.4% drop, and females’ son preference decreased by 0.31 more points, equivalent
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to a 17.8% drop.
The multinomial logistics regression results, as shown in columns (4)–(6) in Ta-
ble 5, provide further evidence for the hypothesis that the FPP weakens women’s
son preference. The specifications are similar to those of the OLS. The strongest
son preference group (Y = 5, “I completely agree”) is left as the reference group.
The results suggest that for cohorts born in the post-FPP period, there are sig-
nificantly more women than men who have weaker son preferences at 1 or 2 (“I
do not agree at all” or “I do not agree most of the time”). Figure 6 plots the
son preference of males and females for each cohort born between 1949 and 1994.
It shows that pre-FPP-born males and females did not differ in son preference,
and since the implementation of the FPP in 1971, post-FPP-born males showed a
small amount of decrease in son preference, while post-FPP-born females showed
significant decreases in son preference.
These results suggest that the FPP can have positive effects in weakening son
preference, though mostly on females. Regarding how the FPP can affect females’
son preference, multiple channels may work. First, the FPP favoured girls, who
received more education, and then girls’ improved education levels changed their
views of female worth (Pande et al., 2005). Second, the FPP helped free women
from the burden of excessive fertility and childcare and allowed more women to
participate in the labour force, which may also change women’s views of female
worth. Third, by reducing the number of children in a family, the FPP helped
create a fairer environment for girls and made the competition between boys and
girls more equal. As adolescence is usually a critical period for children to shape
values and attitudes, a fairer environment may help reverse the traditional mindset
of male superiority. As privilege is usually invisible to those who have it, boys
would not experience as much change as girls in receiving education investments
and having a fairer competition, so it is reasonable to see more pronounced changes
in females’ gender attitudes than in those of males. The findings suggest that
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son preference and, more generally, gender attitudes are not immutable and can
be changed by increasing females’ education levels, by creating a fairer growing
environment for boys and girls and by freeing women from the burden of excessive
fertility and childcare.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows the effects of reducing the number of children in a family on
gender-specific educational attainment in China. By examining the implementation
of the FPP in China since the 1970s, this paper addresses the endogeneity problem
in estimating the causal effect of reducing the number of children on gender-specific
quality outcomes.
I find that from the pre- to the post-FPP period, girls’ education increased
0.5 more years than boys, and the effect was more pronounced in agricultural girls.
From the pre- to the post- FPP period, non-agricultural girls increased the length of
their education by 0.35 more years than non-agricultural boys, whereas the amount
of education completed by agricultural girls increased by 0.49 more years than agri-
cultural boys. These results indicate that, in China where son preference is preva-
lent, reducing the number of children in a family had a sizable impact on improving
the educational attainment of girls and reducing the education gender gap. These
empirical findings appear most in line with the interpretation that parents view
children’s educational spending as a form of investment; thus when sons become
less available, parents increase their investment in daughters for risk diversification
consideration. In addition, I document that the FPP has had a positive impact in
changing gender attitudes. Post-FPP-born women show a more pronounced change
in son preference than men. The findings suggest that son preference and, more
generally, gender attitudes are not immutable and can be changed by increasing
females’ education levels, by creating a fairer growing environment for boys and
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girls and by freeing women from the burden of excessive fertility and childcare.
These findings make contributions to the literature on children’s quantity-quality
trade-off and to the study of family planning policy and the determinants of gender
preference. More specifically, this paper reports some of the previously overlooked
social benefits of the FPP with respect to improving female education and reducing
son preference. By these means the FPP can help previously education-deprived
women to receive more human capital investment. The findings also have significant
policy implications for societies with a high fertility rate and strong gender pref-
erence. Thus, further research can examine whether similar results hold for other
outcomes and in other contexts.
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Figure 1: The Volume of The Birth Control Surgeries (in millions)
Notes: This figure shows the volume of the birth control surgeries (in millions) in China imposed
by the family planning policy since 1971. It implies that the strength of the compulsory birth
controls has remained quite stable since the policy went into effect.
Source: 2015 China Health and Family Planning Policy Statistics Yearbook
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(a) Whole Population (b) By Group
Figure 2: Total Fertility Rate
Notes: This figure shows the time trend of total fertility rate in China, which is defined as the average number of children that would be born to a woman
at fertile age (15-49). The red verticle line marks the year before the start of the FPP. Panel (a) shows the total fertility rate for the whole population. It
shows that the FPP extensively reduced the total fertility rate, from 5.8 births per woman in 1970 to 2.2 births per woman in 1980. Panel (b) shows the
total fertility rate for agricultural Han households, non-agricultural Han households, and ethnic minorities (including both agricultural and non-agricultural
households ), respectively. It shows that for the period 1971–1980, the total fertility rate for agricultural Han households dropped by nearly 4 births, the
rate for non-agricultural Han households dropped by 2.1 births, and the rate for ethnic minorities dropped by 2.5 births, implying that the FPP had the
greatest impact on the family size of agricultural Han households.
Source: 1986 China Family Planning Policy Statistics Yearbook.
36
(a) Whole Population
Figure 3: Average Years of Education Completed by Boys and by Girls
Notes: This figure shows the average years of education completed by boys and by girls for
agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou status, respectively. Panel (a) is for the whole population.
Panel (b) is for non-agricultural Hukou individuals. Panel (c) is for agricultural Hukou individuals.
In all panels, ethnic minorities are not included.
Source: 1% sample of the 2000 China population census.
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(b) Non-agricultural (c) Agricultural
Figure 3: (Continued) Average Years of Education Completed by Boys and by Girls
Notes: This figure shows the average years of education completed by boys and by girls for agricultural and non-agricultural Hukou status, respectively.
Panel (a) is for the whole population. Panel (b) is for non-agricultural Hukou individuals. Panel (c) is for agricultural Hukou individuals. In all panels,
ethnic minorities are not included.
Source: 1% sample of the 2000 China population census.
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Figure 4: Change in the Linear Trend Rate of the Educational Attainment of Agri-
cultural Girls
Notes: This figure plots the vector of coefficient estimates for the interaction term girl × ag ×
birth year dummy from Equation (3) in the DDD estimation.
Source: 1% sample of the 2000 China population census.
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Figure 5: China’s Gender Ratio at Birth and Total Fertility Rate
Notes: This figure plots China’s gender ratio at birth and total fertility rate for each year. The
left axis corresponds to the total fertility rate. The right axis corresponds to sex ratio at birth.
Source: the World Bank.
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Figure 6: Son Preference of Male and Female over Time
Notes: This figure plots the son preference of males and females for each cohort born between
1949 and 1994. It shows that pre-FPP-born males and females did not differ in son preference,
and since the implementation of the FPP in 1971, post-FPP-born males showed a small amount
of decrease in son preference, while post-FPP-born females showed significant decreases in son
preference. Source: 2014 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS)
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Male Female
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Han
Agricultural
Age 1,414,911 29.47 5.697 18 39 1,418,168 29.48 5.717 18 39
Education Years 1,414,911 8.276 2.315 0 19 1,418,168 7.376 2.628 0 19
Literacy 1,414,911 0.989 0.103 0 1 1,418,168 0.968 0.177 0 1
Household Size 1,414,911 3.838 1.570 1 25 1,418,168 3.996 1.520 1 25
Migration 1,414,911 0.123 0.329 0 1 1,418,168 0.165 0.371 0 1
Employment 1,414,911 0.963 0.188 0 1 1,418,168 0.879 0.326 0 1
Ever Married 1,414,911 0.732 0.443 0 1 1,418,168 0.840 0.367 0 1
First Marriage Age 1,036,342 22.57 2.584 13 39 1,191,335 21.23 2.401 13 39
Non-Agricultural
Age 552,754 29.40 5.900 18 39 527,427 29.22 5.833 18 39
Education Years 552,754 11.85 2.803 0 19 527,427 11.41 2.749 0 19
Literacy 552,754 0.998 0.0437 0 1 527,427 0.997 0.0551 0 1
Household Size 552,754 3.129 1.490 1 22 527,427 3.250 1.433 1 22
Migration 552,754 0.271 0.445 0 1 527,427 0.288 0.453 0 1
Employment 552,754 0.789 0.408 0 1 527,427 0.684 0.465 0 1
Ever Married 552,754 0.672 0.469 0 1 527,427 0.759 0.428 0 1
First Marriage Age 371,481 24.36 2.735 13 39 400,056 22.84 2.449 13 39
Non-Han
Age 187,668 28.79 5.825 18 39 174,782 28.78 5.823 18 39
Education Years 187,668 7.827 3.547 0 19 174,782 6.826 3.943 0 19
Literacy 187,668 0.949 0.219 0 1 174,782 0.879 0.326 0 1
Household Size 187,668 4.124 1.862 1 20 174,782 4.251 1.783 1 20
Migration 187,668 0.115 0.319 0 1 174,782 0.155 0.362 0 1
Employment Status 187,668 0.933 0.250 0 1 174,782 0.860 0.347 0 1
Ever Married 187,668 0.678 0.467 0 1 174,782 0.821 0.383 0 1
First Marriage Age 127,236 22.51 3.137 13 39 143,519 20.83 2.886 13 38
Source: 1% sample of the 2000 China population census.
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Table 2: The Effect of the FPP I: on the Years of Education of Boys and of Girls
Results using Results using
diff-in-diff diff-in-diff-in-diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girl -1.058*** -1.046*** -1.047*** -0.613*** -0.619*** -0.626***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Post 0.982*** 0.944*** -0.074*** 1.209*** 1.110*** 0.020
(0.054) (0.055) (0.015) (0.049) (0.053) (0.030)
Girl × Post 0.517*** 0.504*** 0.505*** 0.345*** 0.349*** 0.351***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Ag -3.428*** -3.317*** -3.339***
(0.054) (0.039) (0.039)
Ag × Post -0.258*** -0.217*** -0.204***
(0.042) (0.035) (0.037)
Girl × Ag -0.526*** -0.515*** -0.506***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
Girl × Ag × Post 0.164*** 0.143*** 0.141***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Birth prefecture FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Linear time trend No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 3,926,555 3,926,555 3,926,555 3,913,260 3,913,260 3,913,260
Notes: This table reports the effects of the family planning policy on the relative educational attainment of boys and of girls. The dependent variable
is individuals’ years of education. The DID estimates from Equation (1) are presented in columns (1)–(3). The DDD estimates from Equation (2) are
presented in columns (4)–(6). The sample includes Han individuals born during 1961-1981. Girl indicates an individual’s gender; Ag indicates the
individual’s Hukou status, equal to 1 if the individual has agricultural Hukou; Post is a dummy variable that indicates if the individual is born after 1971.
The reference group is individuals born from 1961 to 1970. It and all of its interaction terms are dropped. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at
prefecture level: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: The Effect of the FPP II: on Whether An Individual Completed More Than the Compulsory Nine Years of Education
Results using Results using
diff-in-diff diff-in-diff-in-diff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girl -0.156*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Post 0.134*** 0.128*** -0.005** 0.104*** 0.094*** -0.050***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Girl × Post 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ag -0.245*** -0.230*** -0.232***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ag × Post 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.056***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Girl × Ag -0.177*** -0.176*** -0.175***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Girl × Ag × Post 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.067***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Birth prefecture FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Linear time trend No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 3,926,555 3,926,555 3,926,555 3,913,260 3,913,260 3,913,260
Note: This table reports the effects of the family planning policy using an alternative measure of educational attainment: whether an individual completed
more than the compulsory nine years of education. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the highest level of education an individual
achieved exceeded ninth grade, and 0 otherwise. The DID estimates from Equation (1) are presented in columns (1)–(3). The DDD estimates from
Equation (2) are presented in columns (4)–(6). The sample includes Han individuals born during 1961-1981. Girl indicates an individual’s gender; Ag
indicates the individual’s Hukou status, equal to 1 if the individual has agricultural Hukou; Post is a dummy variable that indicates if the individual is
born after 1971. The reference group is individuals born from 1961 to 1970. It and all of its interaction terms are dropped. Standard errors in parenthesis
are clustered at prefecture level: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Placebo Test: The Effect of the FPP for Han and Ethnic Minorities
Years of Beyond
education completed ninth grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girl -1.372*** -1.347*** -1.344*** -0.178*** -0.175*** -0.175***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.085) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Post 0.606*** 0.684*** -0.260*** 0.120*** 0.128*** -0.0471***
(0.066) (0.051) (0.038) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007)
Han 1.286*** 0.478*** 0.484*** 0.221*** 0.083*** 0.084***
(0.137) (0.081) (0.081) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Girl × Post 0.420*** 0.396*** 0.393*** 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.039) (0.034) (0.034) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Girl × Han 0.232*** 0.210** 0.210** -0.020* -0.022** -0.022**
(0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Han × Post 0.325*** 0.186*** 0.157*** 0.062*** 0.043*** 0.038***
(0.053) (0.039) (0.039) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Girl × Han × Post 0.090** 0.095** 0.098*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.037) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Birth prefecture FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Linear time trend No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 3,123,398 3,123,398 3,123,398 3,123,398 3,123,398 3,123,398
Note: This table reports the effects of the family planning policy on the relative educational attainment of boys and of girls for Han and ethnic minorities,
respectively, based on Equation (4). The sample includes agricultural Hukou individuals born during 1961-1981. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3)
is an individual’s years of education. In columns (4)-(6) the dependent variable is whether an individual completed more than the compulsory nine years
of education. Girl indicates an individual’s gender; Han indicates the individual’s ethnicity, equal to 1 if the individual is of Han ethnic; Post is a dummy
variable that indicates if the individual is born after 1971. The reference group is individuals born from 1961 to 1970. It and all of its interaction terms
are dropped. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at prefecture level: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: The Effects of the FPP on the Son Preference of Males and of Females
OLS Multinomial Logistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post -0.355∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.476∗∗
(0.074) (0.076) (0.226)
Female -0.029 -0.034 -0.163∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.029)
Post × Female -0.318∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.051) (0.062)
Y = 1
Post 0.650∗∗∗ -0.105 4.442
(0.153) (0.280) (3.260)
Female 0.109∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.066) (0.062)
Post × Female 0.471∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.103) (0.121)
Y = 2
Post 0.321∗∗∗ -0.343 1.421
(0.100) (0.237) (2.781)
Female -0.067 -0.056 0.183∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.058) (0.068)
Post × Female 0.441∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.094) (0.125)
Y = 3
Post 0.412∗∗∗ -0.033 1.366
(0.086) (0.280) (2.380)
Female -0.152∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.055) (0.053) (0.069)
Post × Female 0.191∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.111
(0.096) (0.097) (0.110)
Y = 4
Post 0.100 -0.093 3.106
(0.069) (0.176) (4.080)
Female -0.087 -0.081 0.015
(0.074) (0.076) (0.063)
Post × Female 0.193∗ 0.187∗ 0.192∗
(0.101) (0.099) (0.105)
Birth prefecture FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Individual covariates No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 17,481 17,481 15,768 17,481 17,481 15,768
Note: This table reports the effects of the family planning policy on the son preference of males
and of females who were born under the FPP. The sample includes individuals born from 1961
to 1990. The son preference of an individual is measured by his/her answers to the following
question: “How much do you agree with the statement ‘A family must have at least one son’?”
Respondents then answered on a 1 to 5 scale with 1 representing “I do not agree at all” and 5
representing “I completely agree”. The OLS estimates from Equation (5) are presented in columns
(1)–(3). Female indicates an individual’s gender; Post is a dummy variable that indicates if the
individual is born after 1971. The reference group is individuals born from 1961 to 1970. It and all
of its interaction terms are dropped. Individual covariates include individual’s age and education
level. The multinomial logistics regression results are presented in columns (4)–(6). Y = 5 is left
as the reference group. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at province level: * significant




Figure A1: Sex Ratios by Birth Year in China
Notes: This figure depicts the sex ratios by birth year for all individuals, agricultural individuals,
and non-agricultural individuals. It is calculated as Number of maleNumber of female . It shows that the sex
ratio remained between 1 and 1.07 before 1982. Given the natural rate of 1.06, it should not be
interpreted as aberrant. The sex ratio becomes more skewed with the introduction of ultrasound
B gender detection technology in the 1980s.
Source: 1% sample of the 2000 China population census.
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Figure A2: Population Growth
Notes: This figure shows that the population growth rate in China has significantly decreased
since the implementation of the Family Planning Policy in 1971.
Source: The statistics for 1968-2000 is from the World Bank. The statistic for 1965 is from the
2015 China Health and Family Planning Policy Statistics Yearbook.
Figure A3: Change in the Linear Trend Rate of the Educational Attainment of
Girls
Notes: This figure plots the vector of coefficient estimates for the interaction term girl ×
birth year dummy in the DID estimation.
Source: 1% sample of the 2000 China population census.
48
Figure A4: University Admission Rate in China
Notes: This figure depicts the university admission rate in China.
Source: Gaokao.com
B Policy Background
B.1 the family planning policy
Family planning in China has gone through three stages15:
1. 1962-1970 Early Attempts Stage
Concerned about the rapid population growth after the 1959-1961 Great Famine, in
1962 the State Council of China issues a policy document encouraging families to use
birth control. The document points that “Family planning should be encouraged in
populous regions to make procreation gradually move from an unplanned state to a
planned state”. In 1964 the Family Planning Commission is set up. In particular,
family planning offices have been established in some urban areas. This period is
a preliminary to the subsequent extensive implementation of the family planning
programs.
2. 1971-1977 Family Planning Policy Implementation Stage
Family planning programs in China were officially launched in 1971 upon the ap-
proval of The report on the work of the family planning policy by the State Council
of China and were included in the 4th Five-Year Plan(1971-1975). Soon after, fam-
15A brief Chinese population policy evolution chronicles can be found here.
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ily planning offices were set up at all administrative levels, and birth control work
was carried out. The objective of the family planning campaign at that time, as ad-
vocated in the campaign slogan, was “one is not too few, two is perfect, and three is
too many”. Later, in the 1973 national family planning symposium, a more explicit
policy “later, less frequent and fewer” (“晚、稀、少”) was introduced. “Later”
refers to women must not get married by age 23 and give birth to their first child
by age 24; “less frequent” indicates the birth spacing must be no less than three
years; “fewer” reflects the policy restriction limiting couples to having no more than
two children. The policies for agricultural and non-agricultural households were the
same until 1982. The target population of the FPP is China’s majority ethnic group
- Han, which accounts for 93% population. Ethnic minorities were not as restricted
as Han citizens. During this period, the policy for ethnic minorities was “In less
populated minority areas, technical guidance for family planning should be given
to those who have birth control willingness.”
3. 1978-2016 One Child Policy Stage
In March 1978, a stricter policy, later commonly known as the One Child Policy,
was adopted in the Fifth National People’s Congress and enshrined in the constitu-
tion. Since the second half of 1979, many places have revised the family planning
regulations in accordance with the requirements of one-child birth. Except for some
less-populated ethnic minorities, one-child birth is fully implemented in urban and
rural areas across the country. Only difficult households in rural areas in some west-
ern provinces (Yunnan, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang) can have two children. As
of the first half of 1980, except Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, all provinces, cities,
and districts have issued interim regulations for family planning (Xinjiang and In-
ner Mongolia introduced regulations in 1981 and 1982 respectively), which imposes
severe economic and administrative penalties on offenders.
In this period a more specific policy is made for ethnic minorities, “For ethnic
minorities, exceptions to the one child policy can only be granted to those with a
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population of 10 million or less. Couples of those ethnicities can have two children,
and some may have three, but four children are not allowed.”
In 1982, the One Child Policy was revised to allow families that satisfied certain
conditions to have a second child. A family can have a second child if it meets
either of the two criteria: The first criterion depends on whether a couple is both
singletons (the only child in their own families). If a couple is both singletons, the
couple is eligible to apply for a second-child permit. This criterion can be seen as
a reward to singletons, though it seldom applied before the 2000s because of the
scarcity of singletons. When either person of a couple is not a singleton, the second
criterion applies, which depends on the Hukou status of the mother and the gender
of the first child. Only when the mother holds agricultural Hukou and the first child
is a girl, the couple is eligible to have a second child. In contrast, non-agricultural
couples cannot apply to have a second child regardless of the gender of the first
child.
If a family does not meet the above conditions but is found to have out-of-quota
children, an economic penalty will apply. To give an idea of how large the fine is, in
Beijing the penalty is roughly 3 to 10 times an individual’s annual income16, which is
a large amount of money for an ordinary family. In addition to the economic penalty,
anyone who works for the government or any state-owned corporations would face
the risk of being dismissed if he/she is found to have out-of-quota children. There
are some minor exceptions for which parents are permitted to have a second child.
For example, when the first child has an intellectual disability.
B.2 The Household Registration (Hukou) System
The household registration system was established in cities in 1951, extended
to rural areas in 1955, and formalized as a permanent system in 1958. Every Chi-
nese resident is classified by the ‘status’ of his/her Hukou registration, essentially
16Beijing Municipal Peoples Government Order No.111, Section 5
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referred to as agricultural or non-agricultural. This classification used to determine
a person’s entitlements to state prerogatives. It originated from the occupational
division in the 1950s. The designation of Hukou registration status for a person is
inherited from that of his or her mother. This is very much a ‘birth-subscribed’
system. Changes in the Hukou registration were strictly controlled before the 1990s.
The main channel is by employment in state-owned corporations or by admission
to higher education institutions. Very limited quotas are granted every year. The
classification of Hukou registration facilitated the state’s control of rural-urban mi-
gration17.
17for more details, Chan and Zhang (1999) provides a complete summary of the Hukou system.
52
